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Norms and institutions have been proposed to regulate multi-agent interactions. How-
ever, agents are intrinsically autonomous, and may thus decide whether to comply with
norms. On the other hand, besides institutional norms, agents may adopt new norms
by establishing commitments with other agents. In this paper we address these issues
by considering an electronic institution that monitors the compliance to norms in an
evolving normative framework: norms are used both to regulate an existing environment
and to define contracts that make agents’ commitments explicit. In particular, we con-
sider the creation of virtual organizations in which agents commit to certain cooperation
efforts regulated by appropriate norms. The supervision of norm fulfillment is based on
the notion of institutional reality, which is constructed by assigning powers to agents en-
acting institutional roles. Constitutive rules make a connection between the illocutions
of those agents and institutional facts, certifying the occurrence of associated external
transactions. Contract specification is based on conditional prescription of obligations.
Contract monitoring relies on rules for detecting the fulfillment and violation of those
obligations. The implementation of our normative institutional environment is supported
by a rule-based inference engine.
Keywords: Electronic institution; norm; contract; virtual organization.
1. Introduction
An increasingly important dichotomy in multi-agent systems (MAS) research con-
fronts concepts such as autonomy and openness to regulation efforts1. While agent
theory31 describes agents as autonomous self-interested entities, preferably inter-
acting in open environments (hence the efforts towards agent communication stan-
dards, such as FIPA-ACL13), the application of MAS in real-world scenarios raises
an important question: how to ensure cooperative behavior in scenarios populated
with heterogeneous and self-interested agents? There are (at least) two possible ap-
proaches to this problem4. One is to impose constraining infrastructures to agents,
dictating coordination rules and making it impossible for agents to deviate from the
desired behavior. However, this approach severely limits agent autonomy; agents are
1
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left to stick to a fixed coordination protocol or do nothing, since any other alterna-
tives are externally constrained by practical impossibility. The other possibility is
to regulate the environment, providing incentives for cooperative behavior through
normative constraints, and allowing agents to choose whether to obey or to violate
them.
A real-world scenario where these concerns clearly apply is in business relation-
ships. In particular, we are concerned with environments in which agents may agree
on cooperation efforts, involving specific interactions during a certain time frame.
By this way agents compose a virtual organization (VO), which is regulated by the
specific norms agreed. Agents may represent different business units or enterprises,
which come together to address new market opportunities by combining skills, re-
sources, risks and finances no partner can alone fulfill9. The subject of virtual or-
ganizations/enterprises is gaining increasing importance in the B2B world, where
players are becoming more focused on their core business and rely on outsourcing
and dynamic consortiums.
Any cooperation activity requires trust between the involved partners. When
considering open environments, previous performance records of potential partners
may not be assessable. If such information is available, reputation mechanisms can
be put in place. If not, we must take into account that it is possible for a VO to
include agents that have never worked together in the past. In this case, trust must
be based on third-parties, which verify that agents comply with their promises. It
is therefore necessary first to explicitly state through a formal and legally binding
contract what an agreement is about, and second to provide an environment for
enforcing those contracts. If no such environment can be put into place, then agents
are on their own to decide whether they are willing to take the risk of being cheated:
mutual trust can only be formed by experience over time.
Electronic Institutions (EI) have been proposed to mimic real-world institutions,
by regulating the interactions between agents. In our view, the EI concept addresses
the above concerns19, as it consists of a coordination framework facilitating the es-
tablishment of contracts and providing a level of trust by offering an enforceable
normative environment. This is accomplished by providing a number of agent-based
institutional services. The EI encompasses a set of norms regulating the environ-
ment. This normative environment evolves as a consequence of the establishment of
agents’ agreements formalized in contractual norms. Therefore, an important role
of the EI is to monitor and enforce, through appropriate services, both predefined
institutional norms and those formalizing contracts that result from a negotiation
process. Agents rely on the EI to monitor their contractual commitments.
The EI is thus a regulated environment where agents interact. When considering
software agents, interactions are based on the exchange of messages (illocutions).
Inside the EI, agents’ illocutions are the starting point towards the formation of
institutional reality (inspired by Ref. 27). This reality is composed of both new
organizational structures (VOs) and actions performed concerning the compliance to
norms. Within institutional boundaries, some agents perform specific institutional
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roles, being certified by the EI as legitimate to achieve certain institutional facts.
External agents may also announce themselves as performing certain external roles.
Instead of providing institutional services, these are general roles (such as supplier
or customer) which may, when performed inside the EI, have a set of attached
norms. By assuming those roles, agents become committed to these norms.
This paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the use of norms within
our EI framework, assigning contexts to them. Afterwards, section 3 develops on
the notion of institutional reality and its creation, by detailing the adaptation of
Ref. 27 to our approach; we imported concepts such as brute and institutional facts,
and constitutive rules, and this section relates them to institutional roles. Section
4 proceeds to the specification of contracts through norms and to their monitoring
and enforcement, taking into account the normative structured presented in section
2. We emphasize on the prescription of obligations and on rules for detecting their
fulfillment or violation. We also show how to deal with VO cooperation agreements.
Section 5 addresses the issue of implementing the normative core of our EI. Section
6 concludes and presents related work.
2. Norms
The concept of social structure is a central issue in the social sciences: it is assumed
to exist in order to impose a sense of order and predictability within a group of
individuals. Social structure typically involves a framework of norms attached to
roles played by members of a society. A role represents the way someone is expected
to behave in particular situations.
From a social perspective, different types of norms can be identified, with differ-
ent abstraction levels. At one hand we have values as general principles, conventions,
and abstract norms that are implicitly adhered to and may not have a formally de-
fined social response in case of deviation. On the other side of the spectrum we may
have formal (legal) norms and prescriptions that include explicitly defined punish-
ments to deal with infractions. Within MAS research, norm classifications have also
been made (e.g. Ref. 29 and 21).
Norms play an important role in open artificial agent systems; they have been
said to improve coordination and cooperation7. As in real-world societies, norms
provide us a way to achieve social order4 by controlling the environment and making
it more stable and predictable.
2.1. Norms vs. rules
The concept of norm has been used interchangeably with the term rule. A subtle
distinction might be that a norm is a rule with a wide applicability, i.e. to a group
of agents. Advanced properties of multi-agent systems, such as the possibility for
norm emergence30, might lead us to say that when a group of agents adheres to a
rule, this rule becomes a norm.
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Another important source of confusion regards the representation of norms in a
declarative and computational fashion. Norms can be implemented with rule-based
systems – this fact contributes to an undifferentiated use of the terms norm and
rule. However, we believe that not all rules are norms. Norms have an intrinsic
property: they prescribe behavior.
2.2. Contextualized norms
Norms can be classified according to different criteria. Considering our EI frame-
work, we find it important to classify norms according to their scope. Accordingly,
we distinguish between institutional, constitutional, and operational norms20.
Institutional norms regulate the behavior of every agent inside the EI. As behav-
ior prescription is typically dependent on agents’ commitments, institutional norms
represent the commitments of agents towards the EI as a whole: by assuming gen-
eral roles, agents become committed to their associated norms. Institutional norms
also include general ways of dealing with contract-independent occurrences, such
as policies for handling norm violations. Institutional norms set up the normative
ground on which cooperation commitments can be established.
Constitutional norms are used to describe the constitution of agents’ virtual or-
ganizations, which thereby commit to a certain cooperation agreement. The terms
of such an agreement are specified by means of norms regulating the created con-
sortium, which usually exists for a period of time.
Finally, operational norms specify contracts by indicating actions to be per-
formed by contractual agents. Operational contracts may be proposed and signed
within the context of a specific VO, or else may comprise a stand-alone deal.
The described classification suggests that different types of norms are created
at different moments. Thus, institutional norms may be pre-existent, while consti-
tutional norms are created when agents reach a cooperation agreement, and oper-
ational norms come into existence when executable contracts are signed. However,
this needs not be the case. Norms with limited scopes may be predefined for a
number of reasons, as follows.
An important concept in contract law theory is the use of “default rules”8. These
exist with the intent of facilitating the formation of contracts, allowing them to be
underspecified by defining default clauses or default values. Therefore, constitutional
or even operational norms may be institutionally defined: together with institutional
norms, they provide a normative background in which agents can rely to build their
contractual commitments.
Furthermore, just as real-world legislations are organized through hierarchies of
laws, it is natural to have predefined regulations devoted to particular contexts,
such as the VO setting. Norms regulating specific aspects of this type of contracts
are, naturally, predefined. Agents can rely on these regulations as a ground basis to
raise specific virtual organizations.
Another situation where norms with a limited scope are pre-existing is when they
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regulate predicted coordination scenarios, as in the case of negotiation protocols.
In such situations, agents agreeing to coordinate their negotiation efforts according
to a certain protocol simply adhere to the norms implementing it. Notice that,
differently from “default rules”, these norms apply as they are to every adhesion to
the protocol; they do not make up mere fill-in prescriptions in case of absence of
explicitly created norms.
According to this setting, it is possible, therefore, to predefine scoped norms
that are to be imposed when the activity they regulate is adhered to by agents.
This methodology may be applied to negotiation protocols, to standard cooperation
commitments among a group of agents, or even to norms attached to roles. Although
having a limited scope, these norms can be seen as institutional in the sense that
they are institutionally predefined.
Independently of the circumstances of their creation, we consider that norms
define, within a given context, what ought to be done in certain circumstances. As
such, norms can be represented as:
[Context] Situation → Prescription
The Context indicates the scope of the norm; as such, we may have norms applicable
inside the whole institution (in which case the context may be omitted), while other
norms may be defined, e.g., inside a particular agents’ VO. The Situation describes
when the norm is in place. The Prescription specifies what should be accomplished
in order for the norm to be fulfilled. Contexts therefore allow us to structure existing
norms and, as we shall see in the next section, permit the contextualization of
occurring facts, facilitating the assessment of their consequences. Contexts will also
support a hierarchical composition of the normative environment.
Using the above representation, norms obviously lend themselves to a rule-based
implementation. The situation part refers to the rule conditions, whereas the pre-
scription part corresponds to the rule’s effects.
3. Institutional Reality
Considering an EI as a place where social relationships are created and enforced, it
is necessary to establish how and when such relationships are in place, and how and
when their underlying commitments are fulfilled. If we design a closed environment
with a well-defined performative structure (as in Ref. 11), then agents’ actions
and their effects are restricted. If, however, we design an open environment where
autonomous agents interact, we must relate those interactions with the (emergence
of) social structures defining interdependencies between agents, that is, specifying
commitments among them. This represents a much more flexible approach towards
the development of a normative framework.
Following Searle’s theory on “the construction of social reality”27, inside the EI
we distinguish between brute facts and institutional facts. The latter are obtained
from the former, through rules defining “counts-as” relations (constitutive rules,
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according to Searle). In our case, brute facts do not refer to physical reality, but
rather to agents’ actions. In a society of artificial agents, the only observable actions
are the utterance of illocutions: these are our basic building blocks, that is, the
brute facts we build on to infer institutional reality. Rules regulating the creation
of institutional facts will verify not only what is uttered, but also who perpetrates
such actions – the effects of illocutions may depend on who utters them.
3.1. Brute facts
Agents’ illocutions are stored as brute facts in an EI component responsible to
interpret them: the “institutional reality engine”. Notice, however, that only mes-
sages sent to the EI are recordable. Agents are free to exchange messages with other
agents, as no restriction on behavior is imposed.
Considering that agents use the FIPA-ACL message structure specification13,
we store their EI-directed illocutions in the form:
illocution(Sender, Content)
where Sender indicates the agent affirming the illocution and Content represents
the content of a FIPA-ACL message. Illocutions stored as brute facts include only
informative messages (e.g., inform14); they are assumed to use a well-defined insti-
tutional ontology.
3.2. Institutional facts
Institutional facts are inferred using constitutive rules. These ascribe meaning to
certain happenings within a certain social context. In our case, such happenings
correspond to agent illocutions (brute facts), which inside the institutional con-
text may produce institutional reality through constitutive rules (more on this in
subsection 3.3.3).
Just as norms have a context in which they apply, we associate institutional
facts with the context within which they occur. Searle argues that there are many
situations in which the context of an institutional fact needs not exist anymore after
that fact has been created (using the “x counts as y in context c” formula). In our
case, the main context consists of the EI itself, inside which certain illocutions count
as certain institutional facts. However, if we consider facts denoting agent behavior
related to deontic notions such as obligations or roles, these facts occur within their
context (e.g. a contract or an organization). Therefore I may, for instance, pay a
given amount of money referring to an invoice issued within a contract. Besides,
institutional reality may be governed by institutionally defined rules, while the facts
themselves may refer to social structures that are of a smaller scope, i.e., represent-
ing a narrower reality (e.g. a contractual relationship between some of the agents, or
an organization including a subset of all the existing agents). Therefore, the context
in which the “counts-as” relation applies may be broader than the sub-context in
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which the fact occurs. This emphasizes the difference between fact recognition (in
an institutional context) and fact contextualization (e.g. contractual).
An important issue to consider in contracting scenarios is time. Every fact must
occur at a certain instant, provided by an institutional clock. We use the following
representation for institutional facts:
[Context] ifact(IFact, Timestamp)
where each part speaks for itself.
3.3. The institutional reality engine
Norm creation and fulfillment supervised by the EI depends on the recording of
brute facts, which are then processed by “systems of constitutive rules”27. As ex-
plained above, brute facts correspond to agents’ illocutions. In our perspective,
institutionally relevant facts include those events that are important in respect
to commitment creation (implying the establishment of contracts) and fulfillment.
Therefore, rules regulating how these facts come about are needed.
3.3.1. Institutional roles
Illocutions are stored as brute facts in our institutional reality engine. The effects of
such illocutions may depend on the actors uttering them. To deal with this we iden-
tify a set of institutional roles enacted by agents providing institutional services.
Thus, some institutional facts may come into existence only if agents performing
certain institutional roles execute some predetermined actions (that is, utter appro-
priate illocutions). Authoritative relations are established in this way between roles
and institutional reality: an agent performing a given role is said to be empowered
to achieve the effects expressed in its role-related constitutive rules. This, however,
does not imply that illocutions of agents which do not perform institutional roles
have no relevance. We may still define rules empowering them. Typically, however,
those agents will need to interact with agents performing institutional roles, in order
to obtain certain institutional facts.
As we are concerned with the application of our model to business scenarios
involving transactions, we identify three main institutional roles providing a con-
nection to the real-world. A messenger role provides certified information exchange
facilities. A banking role enables acknowledging monetary value transfers. A deliv-
ery tracker role certifies product delivery. Different domains may require different
types of roles; whenever a third-party is needed to certify the occurrence of a fact,
an institutional role with its associated constitutive rules should be in place.
3.3.2. An ontology for brute and institutional facts
Although agents are free to utter any illocutions, only a subset of these has a
meaning inside the EI. The institutional ontology may include the messages (brute
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facts) presented in table 1.
Table 1. An ontology for brute facts
Content Meaning
currency transfered(Ctx, Ag1, Am, Ag2, T) a currency transfer of amount
Am was made at time T be-
tween agents Ag1 and Ag2,
within context Ctx
paid(Ctx, Am, Ag2, T) I have paid amount Am at
time T to agent Ag2, within
context Ctx
collected(Ctx, Am, Ag1, T) I have collected amount Am
at time T from agent Ag1,
within context Ctx
delivered(Ctx, Ag1, Item, Qt, Ag2, T) a delivery of Qt units of Item
was made at time T from
agent Ag1 to Ag2, within con-
text Ctx
sent(Ctx, Item, Qt, Ag2, T) I have sentQt units of Item at
time T to agent Ag2, within
context Ctx
received(Ctx, Item, Qt, Ag1, T) I have received Qt units of
Item at time T from agent
Ag1, within context Ctx
msg delivered(Ctx, Ag1, Msg, Ag2, T) message Msg was delivered at
time T from agent Ag1 to
Ag2, within context Ctx
msg sent(Ctx, Msg, Ag2, T) I have sent message Msg at
time T to agent Ag2, within
context Ctx
msg received(Ctx, Msg, Ag1, T) I have received message Msg
at time T from agent Ag1,
within context Ctx
When uttered by agents enacting appropriate roles, these illocutions produce
the institutional facts presented in table 2.
If other kinds of facts are needed, this institutional ontology may be extended
to consider them.
Institutional reality is not exclusively created from agents’ illocutions. An impor-
tant exception is the generation of institutional facts corresponding to time events,
which are important for detecting violations of obligations (as described in section
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Table 2. An ontology for institutional facts
IFact Meaning
payment(Ag1, Am, Ag2) a payment of amount Am
took place from agent Ag1 to
Ag2
delivery(Ag1, Item, Qt, Ag2) a delivery of Qt units of Item
took place from agent Ag1 to
Ag2
msg(Ag1, Msg, Ag2) a message Msg was delivered
from agent Ag1 to Ag2
4.2).
3.3.3. Constitutive rules
Constitutive rules, the central component of the institutional reality engine, make a
connection between what is said and what is taken for granted and possible conse-
quences of this. Many of these rules will define institutional roles and their powers.
According to our EI rationale, we identify two main focuses for constitutive rules:
(1) the recognition of action execution, and (2) the establishment of commitments
through contracts. The former includes the fulfillment of contracts through the
realization of appropriate transactions.
The verification of action execution is important because of trustworthiness is-
sues. The way we address this problem is through the use of the aforementioned
institutional roles.
Certifying action execution
Consider a situation in which an agent ought to make a certain payment to
another. Although the agent may claim to have paid its debt, that does not make
it the case. Still, if an independent financial third party agent (the receiver’s bank),
providing a certified institutional service, states that a currency transfer referring
to a certain context (e.g. a purchase contract) has taken place, it would be safe to
consider that the payment took place:
illocution(B, currency transfered(Ctx, Ag1, Amount, Ag2, Time)) ∧
ibank(B)
→ [Ctx] ifact(payment(Ag1, Amount, Ag2), Time)
We can also say that if both agents (the payer and the receiver) state that a
payment took place, it would also be safe to conclude the associated institutional
fact:
illocution(Ag1, paid(Ctx, Amount, Ag2, )) ∧
illocution(Ag2, collected(Ctx, Amount, Ag1, Time))
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→ [Ctx] ifact(payment(Ag1, Amount, Ag2), Time)
Another exemplifying case where physical actions must be checked concerns the
delivery of products. We may trust on a delivery tracking service:
illocution(DT, delivered(Ctx, Ag1, Item, Quantity, Ag2, Time)) ∧
idelivery tracker(DT)
→ [Ctx] ifact(delivery(Ag1, Item, Quantity, Ag2), Time)
And again rely on the confirmation of both involved parties:
illocution(Ag1, sent(Ctx, Item, Quantity, Ag2, )) ∧
illocution(Ag2, received(Ctx, Item, Quantity, Ag1, Time))
→ [Ctx] ifact(delivery(Ag1, Item, Quantity, Ag2), Time)
The same methodology can be applied concerning the exchange of messages. If
message delivery recognition is a must, an institutional messenger service may be
provided. This way, interactions between agents through the exchange of messages
can be recorded, as long as such a service intermediates the process. Agents may
use this service by using the FIPA-ACL proxy communicative act14.
The messenger service informs the EI that a given message was delivered. The
following constitutive rule applies:
illocution(M, msg delivered(Ctx, Ag1, Msg, Ag2, Time)) ∧
imessenger(M)
→ [Ctx] ifact(msg(Ag1, Msg, Ag2), Time)
The context (Ctx ) of the message delivered may be obtained from the FIPA-ACL
message conversation-id parameter13.
Agents can also confirm such a message delivery:
illocution(Ag1, msg sent(Ctx, Msg, Ag2, )) ∧
illocution(Ag2, msg received(Ctx, Msg, Ag1, Time))
→ [Ctx] ifact(msg(Ag1, Msg, Ag2), Time)
In principle, any information exchange could be treated in a similar way. This
opens up the possibility to verify business-related activities such as order placement,
invoice issuing, acceptance confirmations, or shipment notices. It also enables the
follow-up of negotiation processes that require the exchange of proposals. As an
example, we may acknowledge the placement of an order using the following rule:
[Context] ifact(msg(A1, Msg, A2), Time) ∧
Msg = order(Item, Quantity)
→ ifact(order(A1, Item, Quantity, A2), Time)
There is, though, a difference between this particular rule and the former ones:
it is based on institutional facts. These may, therefore, be used to infer new institu-
tional reality. The indicated context applies both to the antecedent and consequent
ifacts, which report to the same context.
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Establishing commitments
As for contract establishment, we must define relations between institutional
facts (created from agents’ illocutions) and commitment formation. The distin-
guishing feature of these rules is that they define how new institutionally enforce-
able norms can be created, where norms describe contractual relationships between
agents.
Contractual relationships may rise from an appropriate exchange of messages.
These may be logged, as above, using an institutional messenger service. Constitu-
tive rules are used to detect situations in which contracts come into existence, as a
result of a successful interaction. For instance, a contract may be recognized if an
agent accepts the terms and conditions proposed by the other (that is, when they
reach an agreement):
ifact(acceptation(Ag1, Ag2), TA) ∧
ifact(proposal(Ag2, Ag1, Proposal, Timeout), TP) ∧
TP<TA<TP+Timeout
→ register new contract(Ag1, Ag2, Proposal, TA)
where register new contract would be an institutional procedure registering the con-
tract between the involved agents. The proposal should embrace contractual details,
such as contract clauses. This can be simplified by means of contract templates, over
which agents negotiate by instantiating negotiable parameters.
While the above rule comprises a simple example, several researchers address the
issue of commitment creation from interaction protocols. A survey may be found in
Ref. 22.
If, however, negotiation protocols must be enforced, or if negotiation must be
mediated (besides mere message forwarding), negotiation mediation services may
be provided by an institutional agent (i.e., an agent providing an institutional ser-
vice). This applies to negotiation protocols specifically devoted to formalizing VO
cooperation agreements23.
Agents may also use the EI for contract enforcement purposes only. Therefore,
it is possible to conceive a notary service where agents can register contracts, which
become in force upon all participants confirmation (either through digital authen-
tication or simple illocutionary adhesion).
3.4. Institutional reality and norms
Institutional reality forms the basis for implementing a normative framework reg-
ulating the institutional environment. Figure 1 shows the connection between con-
stitutive rules and norms. As explained above, besides creating institutional facts,
constitutive rules also make it possible to generate new norms, which regulate a
specific relationship amongst a group of agents by specifying commitments.
There is an important part of institutional reality that is not dependent on
agent’s illocutions: time. As we explain in the next section, norm prescriptions are
frequently dependent on deadlines, which make it important to verify the passage
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Fig. 1. Connection between constitutive rules and norms
of time using a synchronized (institutional) clock.
4. Specifying and Monitoring Contracts through Norms
Behavior norms prescribe the expected behavior of agents. Usually, such norms
specify states of affairs that must be brought about by an agent before a certain
deadline. Therefore, we consider obligations as the means to express the prescription
of behavior norms. Obligations have the following structure:
[Context] obligation(Bearer, InstitutionalFact, Deadline)
Notice that instead of dictating the exact action an agent must perform, we pre-
scribe the institutional fact that he must bring about. This fits with our model
of institutional reality, where we specify by means of constitutive rules how an in-
stitutional fact may be accrued. It also enables an agent to delegate or outsource
tasks conducting to the accomplishment of such state of affairs, while still being
responsible before the institution for the (un)fulfillment of the obligation.
Contracts are specified by describing what obligations hold in which situations.
They comprise the exchange of resources (e.g. products and money) between partic-
ipants. While simple purchase contracts are composed of a predetermined normative
path (that is, a sequence of fixed obligations), VO cooperation agreements are more
complex, in that they have an ongoing nature. They describe cooperation efforts
of participating agents, whose performance is dependent on appropriate requests.
Therefore, VO agreements include repetitive yet unscheduled interactions.
4.1. Simple contracts
General contracts for purchase operations between a customer and a vendor can be
specified by an institutional fact stating that such a contract is in place, together
with a set of behavior norms representing contract clauses that prescribe the ex-
pected behavior of contracting partners. Concerning behavior norms, there are two
complementary approaches: the institution may provide a predefined set of norms
to which agents limit themselves to agree, or the agents may define their own set
of norms.
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4.1.1. Using a predefined set of norms
An institutional fact introducing the purchase contract describes the involved par-
ties and the resources to be exchanged. It is an instantiation of:
[] ifact(purchase contract(IdPC, Customer, Vendor, Item, Qt, Price),
PCTime)
The contract’s behavior norms can be predefined and applicable to any purchase
contract adhering to them (the contract id is left unspecified in the norms):
[purchase contract:IdPC]
obligation(Vendor, delivery( , Item, Quantity, Customer), PCTime+10)
[purchase contract:IdPC] fulfilled(Vendor, delivery( , Item, Quantity,
Customer), TD)
→ obligation(Customer, payment( , Price, Vendor), TD+30)
The syntax is simplified for greater readability: in this representation, we as-
sume variable names have contract scope (as opposed to Prolog’s clause scope).
The absence of a designated agent in institutional facts indicates that such tasks
may be delegated (that is, the agent achieving the indicated state of affairs may be
other than the obligation’s bearer). Within a norm, literals either in the situation
or in the prescription part are contextualized. Although these norms have a con-
text embracing all purchase contracts, they concretize their context (by means of
instantiation) upon their “run-time” appliance to a specific purchase contract.
4.1.2. Defining customized contracts
The set of predefined norms as defined above makes it easier to establish a new
purchase contract. However, these norms are fixed. If different purchase contracts
are needed, they may be negotiated using contract templates. Different templates
may be defined, with different flexibilities. At the extreme, agents can define the
behavior norms that will specify their contractual relationship. However, starting a
negotiation where nothing is fixed represents a too ill-structured problem to consider
automating. The importance of a contract template resides on its ability to provide
a structure on which negotiation can be based.
Therefore, contract templates with different degrees of flexibility may be pro-
vided, allowing agents to negotiate their details by instantiating parameters. Still,
the resulting contract is represented as an institutional fact:
[] ifact(custom purchase contract(IdCPC, C, V, I, Qt, P), CPCTime)
Depending on the template used, different sets of norms may be obtained. The
difference to the previous approach is that these norms will be applicable only to
the contract at hand, and will thus be instantiated with customized contract data.
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4.1.3. Sanctioning norms
Behavior norms may be complemented with sanctioning norms that prescribe new
obligations in case of violation. The general structure of a sanctioning norm is as
follows:
[Context] violated(Bearer, IFact, Deadline)
→ obligation(Bearer, NewIFact, NewDeadline)
This norm states that if the agent identified as the bearer for the achievement
of an institutional fact fails to do so by a certain deadline, then a new obligation
is assigned to him. Thus, a violation imposes a new obligation on the prevaricator.
Considering the two described approaches for norms in purchase contracts, the
Context may be either general purchase contracts or a specific customized purchase
contract.
Sanctioning norms are useful to discourage norm violation. If the new prescribed
obligation is violated again, other enforcement mechanisms must be put into place,
such as reputation updates (see below), or other coercive measures.
4.2. Fulfillment and violation of obligations
Institutional facts (which are contextualized) are used to verify the fulfillment of
obligations. For this, we define an obligation fulfillment rule applicable to all con-
texts (that is, to any contractual relationship monitored by the EI):
[Context] ifact(IFact, T) ∧ obligation(Bearer, IFact, Deadline) ∧
T<Deadline
→ fulfilled(Bearer, IFact, T)
This rule indicates that if an institutional fact prescribed by an obligation is
achieved before its deadline, then that obligation is fulfilled. As with behavior norms,
literals within the rule are dependent on its context. That is, if an obligation within a
certain contract is accomplished, the fulfillment of such obligation occurs, obviously,
inside that same contract. However, this rule is institutional, in that it applies to
all contractual relations; it thus has un-instantiated context.
This rule is fundamental for enabling the chaining of obligations within a con-
tractual relationship. It establishes a connection between the institutional facts that
are added and the pending obligations.
The connection between behavior norms and sanctioning norms is achieved
through violation detection mechanisms. These are based on violation detection
rules, which fire when deadlines have elapsed. For this we consider time events,
which are generated as institutional facts corresponding to the time when obliga-
tions are due.
[Context] ifact(time, Deadline) ∧
obligation(Bearer, IFact, Deadline) ∧ not(fulfilled(Bearer, IFact, ))
→ violated(Bearer, IFact, Deadline)
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This violation detection rule states that in any context, if a deadline referring
to an obligation was reached, and such obligation was not fulfilled, then a violation
occurred (in the same context).
The resulting fact stating that a violation has occurred may be used to apply
punishment measures, either direct (sanctions, restrictions, interdictions) or indirect
(reputation). We may connect a violation with an update on the agent’s reputation:
[Context] violated(Bearer, IFact, Deadline)
→ update reputation(Bearer, ReputationPunishmentValue)
Violations can constrain the effects of further actions from the prevaricator’s
part, thus making it possible to define prohibitions based on violations. Since we
cannot restrict the actions taken by truly autonomous agents, one way of defining
such constraints is by affecting the constitutive rules, which relate agent’s illocutions
to institutional reality. By this way, we forbid an agent of achieving the effects of
uttering appropriate illocutions (e.g., signing a new contract). Another possibility
is for violations to interdict agent access to institutional services, such as message
delivery, negotiation mediation, or contract registration through a notary service.
Violations may also be used in a less severe way, simply by prescribing new
obligations to be attended, as specified in the contract. This approach allows us to
distinguish violation detection from sanction imposition mechanisms. While the de-
tection of violations is a general and institutionally defined concept, the prescription
of sanctions may be contract-specific.
4.3. Virtual organization cooperation agreements
A cooperation agreement aggregates the organization’s constitutional information,
including the cooperation effort agents commit to, and their general business process
flow. As with simple contracts, we can choose to have predefined norms applicable
to typical cooperation agreements, or let agents customize their norms (which may
be done using templates, so as to keep enabling the automation of the VO set-up
phase).
Considering the first case, an institutional fact registers that a cooperation agree-
ment is in effect within a group of agents, each ensuring a specific cooperation effort.
The following templates are used to specify this information:
[] ifact(cooperation agreement(IdCA, Participants, Resources),
CATime)
[cooperation agreement:IdCA]
coop effort(Participant, Resource, MinQt, MaxQt, Frequency,
UnitPrice)
[cooperation agreement:IdCA] business process(From, Resource, To)
Cooperation efforts indicate quantity ranges for the supply of resources, within
a given frequency, together with agreed prices. They represent the commitments
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of participants. Business process entries indicate the resources that are supposed
to flow between participants. Their effective transfer, however, is dependent on
appropriate requests. That is, business process statements do not indicate specific
dates or quantities; these will be specified at “run-time”, as needed according to
the business performance.
A minimum of one coop effort fact per participant and per resource should be
present. Also, there should be at least one business process fact for each coop effort,
and their agent-resource linkage must conform to the latter. The cooperation agree-
ment contract should also verify that all participants and resources specified within
cooperation effort and business process sections are included in the participants and
resources declared in the institutional fact. These validations can be performed by
a contract validation facility that checks the contract before appending it to the
normative environment.
The central norm in respect to contractual promises represents the fact that
each agent is committed to its cooperation effort. As with other behavior norms,
this translates to an obligation prescription:
[cooperation agreement:IdCA]
ifact(request(Requester, Resource, Qt, Answerer), TR) ∧
business process(Answerer, Resource, Requester) ∧
coop effort(Answerer, Resource, MinQt, MaxQt, Freq, ) ∧
calculate performed effort(Answerer, Resource, Freq, TR, PE) ∧
PE+Qt ≤ MaxQt
→ obligation(Answerer, acknowledge(Answerer, Resource, Qt,
Requester), TR+10)
This norm is institutional: it applies to all cooperation agreements created in-
side the institution. Thus, as before, its context remains unbound until it is in
use. Briefly, it states that if a contractually predicted request (considering the
stated business process and cooperation effort) is made in the context of a cooper-
ation agreement, then the envisaged agent is obliged to accept it. An institutional
procedure (calculate performed effort) is invoked for calculating the effort already
performed by the agent within the time frame indicated in the cooperation effort
frequency, taking into account the request time. If the agent does not exceed its
promised efforts (that is, if the previously supplied amount of resource is sufficiently
below the agent’s stated commitment), the obligation comes into effect.
4.3.1. Operational contracts
Operational contracts are established in the context of a cooperation agreement.
Institutional facts register their creation:
[cooperation agreement:IdCA]
ifact(operational contract(IdOC, Requester, Answerer, Resource, Qt),
OCTime)
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Considering parties’ cooperation commitments, operational contracts come into
existence through a constitutive rule of the form:
[cooperation agreement:IdCA]
fulfilled(Answerer, acknowledge(Answerer, Resource, Qt, Requester),
TA)
→ register new operational contract(IdCA, Requester, Answerer,
Resource, Qt, TA)
This rule applies to every cooperation agreement, and states that when an agent
fulfils its obligation to acknowledge a given request, a new operational contract
comes into existence. The acknowledgement is meant to inform the requester that
the partner (as it ought) will indeed stick to its promise, and the operational contract
can be put into place.
The cooperation agreement may also specify how operational contracts are man-
aged, that is, what obligation chains implement such activity. Norms prescribing
behavior on operational contracts may thus be pre-specified when the cooperation
agreement is created.
One possibility is to consider operational contracts as purchase contracts using
a predefined set of norms:
[cooperation agreement:IdCA]
ifact(operational contract(IdOC, Requester, Answerer, Resource, Qt),
OCTime) ∧
coop effort(Answerer, Resource, , , , UnitPrice)
→ ifact(purchase contract(IdOC, Requester, Answerer, Resource, Qt,
UnitPrice*Qt), OCTime)
Another option is to specify norms applicable to all operational contracts within
a cooperation agreement. These would be defined, once again, using appropriate
templates. For instance, if delivery and payment should occur within an operational
contract:
[cooperation agreement:IdCA, operational contract:IdOC]
obligation(Answerer, delivery( ,Resource, Quantity, Requester),
OCTime+10)
[cooperation agreement:IdCA, operational contract:IdOC]
fulfilled(Answerer, delivery( , Resource, Quantity, Requester), TD) ∧
coop effort(Answerer, Resource, , , , UnitPrice)
→ obligation(Requester, payment( , UnitPrice*Quantity, Answerer),
TD+30)
in which IdOC remains unbound, as these norms apply to all operational contracts
which will be created in the future within agreement IdCA.
If, however, nothing is pre-specified, then agents must negotiate the terms of
operational contracts, again assisted by templates. If they do not, then an institu-
tional default policy may be defined, applicable to all operational contracts of all
cooperation agreements.
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5. Implementing a Normative Environment
Most work on normative systems relies on deontic formalizations, and focuses on
defining formal semantics. However, recent attention is being given towards norm
implementation in MAS28. An explicit declarative representation of norms is needed.
If norms are enclosed inside agents’ code, we get a static environment where norms
cannot change over time. This prevents agents from adopting norms by establishing
commitments through contracts.
According to Ref. 28, an operational semantics for norms comes down to ei-
ther (i) defining constraints on unwanted behavior, or to (ii) detecting violations
and reacting to these violations. In MAS, the absence of control over autonomous
agent behavior leads us to the latter practice. Taking this into account, in our EI
environment norms are based on obligation prescription. Agents’ actions may be
constrained as an outcome of violation conducts.
As obligations have associated deadlines, an institutional clock is essential for
violation detection. It is responsible for generating institutional facts corresponding
to time instants when deadlines are due.
Fulfillment detection is based on the assumption that it is in the best interest
of agents to publicize the fulfillment of obligations. They do so by provoking the
achievement of corresponding institutional facts (which are accrued by authorized
agents). If agents fail to convince the EI that they complied, then they expose
themselves to punishments, either direct (e.g. sanctions) or social (e.g. reputation
records). This means that the active part of norm enforcement concerns the detec-
tion of violations, while their fulfillment is verified passively, upon the occurrence
of external events (that is, events triggered by external agents).
Norms lend themselves to a rule-based implementation. Since the normative
environment is based on the occurrence of events, the obvious solution towards its
implementation is by using a forward-chaining production system (e.g. JESS17).
The knowledge base consists of norms, rules and contracts; the working memory
includes facts, obligations and sanctions (see figure 2).
The notions of templates and default norms demand for a default reasoning ap-
proach. An expert system shell that supports this kind of reasoning is thus appropri-
ate (JESS17 incorporates features enabling both rule and frame-based approaches,
including also the possibility to define modules, which may be used to organize sets
of rules – norm contexts in our case).
We now develop on our implementation using the JESS shell [JESS]. We describe
our use of Jess templates and rule definitions. Jess uses a Lisp-like notation, in that
a relation is defined using a list whose head is the name of the relation. It is also
possible to define templates for facts, where they can be structured with slots. We
explore this facility to structure institutional reality, and we rely on the simpler list
representation for handling ontology-related slots.
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Fig. 2. Normative environment as a rule-based production system
5.1. Representing institutional reality
We start by defining templates for brute and institutional facts, and for roles. When
a message arrives, it is asserted as an instance of the following template:
(deftemplate illocution
"Brute facts"
(slot sender)
(multislot content)
)
The ontology for brute facts is subsumed inside multislot content.
Institutional facts resulting from the application of constitutive rules are based
on a template taking into account the context within which that fact occurred:
(deftemplate ifact
"Institutional facts"
(slot context (default MAIN))
(slot when)
(multislot fact)
(slot processed (default FALSE))
)
The ontology for institutional facts is subsumed inside multislot fact. The indica-
tion of the processed state of an ifact is useful for the application of norms.
Roles performed by agents are defined using the following template:
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(deftemplate agent-role
"Roles for agents"
(slot agent)
(slot role)
)
We then add templates that allow us to create norm-related elements, such as
obligations, their fulfillment or violation. These are based on the institutional fact
template, adding the associated bearer:
(deftemplate obligation extends ifact
"Obligation definition"
(slot bearer)
)
(deftemplate fulfilled extends ifact
"Obligation fulfillment"
(slot bearer)
)
(deftemplate violated extends ifact
"Obligation violation"
(slot bearer)
)
For dealing with the normative framework, we define the notion of context,
together with appropriate templates for dealing with different kinds of contractual
structures. A context has a creation date and points to a super-context from which
norms can be inherited:
(deftemplate context
"Contexts for norms"
(slot super-context (default MAIN))
(slot id)
(slot when)
)
A cooperation agreement extends the context definition by indicating the mul-
tiple participants, their cooperation efforts, and the business process to be imple-
mented:
(deftemplate coop-agreement extends context
"Virtual Organization cooperation agreement"
(multislot who)
)
(deftemplate coop-effort
"Cooperation effort of a VO partner"
(slot context)
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(slot agent)
(slot resource)
(slot max-qt)
(slot unit-price)
)
(deftemplate business-process
"Resource flow between VO partners"
(slot context)
(slot from)
(slot resource)
(slot to)
)
An operational contract is a context involving two of the VO partners. It will
have a cooperation agreement as its super-context:
(deftemplate op-contract extends context
"Operational contract"
(slot purchaser)
(slot supplier)
(slot resource)
(slot quantity)
(slot unit-price)
)
A purchase contract involves a vendor and a customer, the item sold and its
price:
(deftemplate purchase-contract extends context
"Purchase contract"
(slot vendor)
(slot customer)
(slot item)
(slot price)
)
5.2. Defining rules
Because Jess is a rule-based system shell, rule definition is straightforward.
5.2.1. Implementing constitutive rules
Constitutive rules are implemented taking into account the illocution,
agent-role, and ifact templates. For example:
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(defrule payments
"Constitutive rule for acknowledging payments"
(illocution (sender ?a)
(content currency-transfered ?ctx ?fr ?am ?to ?wh))
(agent-role (agent ?a) (role ibank))
=>
(assert (ifact (context ?ctx) (fact payment ?fr ?am ?to)
(when ?wh) ) )
)
5.2.2. Implementing rules for monitoring
Rules for detecting the fulfillment or violation of obligations take into account ifact
and obligation templates. A fulfillment is detected when an obligation’s institu-
tional fact comes about before the obligation’s deadline:
(defrule detect-fulfillment
"Detect the fulfillment of an obligation"
(ifact (context ?c) (fact $?f) (when ?t))
(obligation (context ?c) (bearer ?b) (fact $?f)
(when ?deadline) )
(test (< ?t ?deadline))
=>
(assert (fulfilled (context ?c) (bearer ?b) (fact $?f)
(when ?t) ) )
)
A violation is detected when a time fact corresponding to a non-fulfilled obliga-
tion is reached:
(defrule detect-violation
"Detect the violation of an obligation"
(ifact (context ?c) (fact time) (when ?t))
(obligation (context ?c) (bearer ?b) (fact $?f)
(when ?t) )
(not (fulfilled (context ?c) (bearer ?b) (fact $?f)))
=>
(assert (violated (context ?c) (bearer ?b) (fact $?f)
(when ?t) ) )
)
Several additional rules may be defined in order to make the system more re-
sponsive. For instance, notifications can be sent to agents whenever new obligations
arise.
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5.3. Norm organization and application
In order to address the possible application of default norms (defined as Jess rules),
we chose to group the norms applicable in a given context in a Jess module. Modules
allow for organizing a system with a potentially large number of rules. In our case,
each context will correspond to a module, and will point to a super-context (see
subsection 5.1) from which default rules can be applied.
5.3.1. Defining norms
Norms are defined as Jess rules and grouped inside appropriate modules. Default
rules applicable in a given context are defined inside a super-context (that is, inside
another module). The MAIN module subsumes institutionally defined norms.
For example, we may define how to handle a simple purchase contract by default.
We may start by saying that when the contract’s initial time is reached, an obligation
to deliver the item is added:
(defrule MAIN::pc-initial-obligation-to-deliver
"Start with an obligation to deliver the item"
?st <- (ifact (context ?ctx) (fact time) (when ?w)
(processed FALSE) )
(purchase-contract (id ?ctx) (when ?w) (customer ?cus)
(vendor ?ven) (item ?it) )
=>
(assert (obligation (context ?ctx) (bearer ?ven)
(when (+ ?w 10))
(fact delivery ?ven ?it ?cus) ) )
(modify ?st (processed TRUE))
)
After delivery, an obligation to pay for the item comes about:
(defrule MAIN::pc-obligation-to-pay-after-deliver
"After delivery, create obligation to pay for the item"
?ff <- (fulfilled (context ?ctx) (bearer ?ven) (when ?w)
(processed FALSE)
(fact delivery ?ven ? ?cus) )
(purchase-contract (id ?ctx) (customer ?cus)
(vendor ?ven) (price ?pr) )
=>
(assert (obligation (context ?ctx) (bearer ?cus)
(when (+ ?w 30))
(fact payment ?cus ?pr ?ven) ) )
(modify ?ff (processed TRUE))
)
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We may also define sanctions. If the delivery obligation is not met, maintain the
obligation to deliver (with an extended deadline) and add a monetary penalty:
(defrule MAIN::pc-sanction-delivery-violation
"If vendor fails delivery, add compensation obligation"
?vi <- (violated (context ?ctx) (bearer ?ven) (when ?w)
(processed FALSE)
(fact delivery ?ven ?it ?cus) )
(purchase-contract (id ?ctx) (customer ?cus)
(vendor ?ven) (price ?pr))
=>
(assert (obligation (context ?ctx) (bearer ?ven)
(when (+ ?w 5))
(fact delivery ?ven ?it ?cus) ) )
(assert (obligation (context ?ctx) (bearer ?ven)
(when (+ ?w 5))
(fact payment ?ven (* ?pr 0.1) ?cus) ) )
(modify ?vi (processed TRUE))
)
If the payment obligation is not met, increase the value due and extend the deadline:
(defrule MAIN::pc-sanction-payment-violation
"If customer fails to pay, increase payment due"
?vi <- (violated (context ?ctx) (bearer ?cus) (when ?w)
(processed FALSE)
(fact payment ?cus ?pr ?ven) )
(purchase-contract (id ?ctx) (customer ?cus)
(vendor ?ven) (price ?pr))
=>
(assert (obligation (context ?ctx) (bearer ?cus)
(when (+ ?w 15))
(fact payment ?cus (* ?pr 1.1) ?ven) ) )
(modify ?vi (processed TRUE))
)
As for VOs, we may state that every VO partner must stick to its promise, being
obliged to comply with a given request:
(defrule MAIN::ca-stick-to-promise
"Each partner must stick with his coop-effort promise"
?if <- (ifact (context ?ctx) (when ?w) (processed FALSE)
(fact msg ?ag1 request ?res ?qt ?ag2) )
(coop-agreement (id ?ctx))
(coop-effort (context ?ctx) (agent ?ag2) (resource ?res)
May 26, 2006 15:13 WSPC/INSTRUCTION FILE ijcis˙eas˙hlc˙eco˙final3
Institutional Reality and Norms: Specifying and Monitoring Agent Organizations 25
(max-qt ?mqt))
(test (< ?qt ?mqt))
(business-process (context ?ctx) (from ?ag2)
(resource ?res) (to ?ag1))
=>
(assert (obligation (context ?ctx) (bearer ?ag2)
(when (+ ?w 10))
(fact msg ?ag2 acknowledge ?res ?qt ?ag1) ) )
(modify ?if (processed TRUE))
)
Also, a request acknowledgement leads to an operational contract:
(defrule MAIN::ca-fulfill-promise
"Partner fulfills promise: new op-contract"
?ff <- (fulfilled (context ?ctx) (bearer ?ag2) (when ?w)
(processed FALSE)
(fact msg ?ag2 acknowledge ?res ?qt ?ag1) )
(coop-agreement (id ?ctx))
(coop-effort (context ?ctx) (agent ?ag2) (resource ?res)
(unit-price ?upr) )
=>
(reg-new-op-contract ?w ?ctx ?ag1 ?ag2 ?res ?qt ?upr)
(modify ?ff (processed TRUE))
)
Norms regulating operational contracts can be defined similarly to those of pur-
chase contracts.
Although these examples are defined at an institutional level, overriding norms
may be defined in specific contexts representing specific contracts. It is the environ-
ment’s responsibility to decide which norms apply, as follows.
5.3.2. Applying norms
A rule for managing the application of norms will handle the execution focus for
rules defined in different modules. Jess applies rules defined in the module having
focus; if no rule is applicable, the module is removed from a focus-stack, and the
next module gets focus. We define a rule for building a focus-stack each time a new
institutional fact is created:
(defrule focus-on-new-irelement-contexts
"When a new ifact is created, create its focus stack"
(declare (salience 100))
(ifact (context ?c))
(context (id ?c) (super-context ?s))
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=>
(focus ?s) (focus ?c)
)
The salience value indicates that this rule should fire before any institutional norm.
That is, through this rule, priority is given to norms defined at the innermost
context.
5.4. Example and integration
Let us suppose that three agents, representing different organizations, create a VO,
which is to be regulated by institutionally defined norms. Agent A accepts customer
orders for product X (made of two components Y and Z), for which it requires the
cooperation of agents B and C. These are responsible for supplying components Y
and Z, respectively. The following definitions implement this scenario, and include
further details:
(defmodule caX)
(coop-agreement
(id caX) (when 162345) (who A B C)
)
(coop-effort
(context caX) (agent B) (resource Y) (max-qt 10)
(unit-price 3)
)
(coop-effort
(context caX) (agent C) (resource Z) (max-qt 5)
(unit-price 8)
)
(business-process
(context caX) (from B) (resource Y) (to A)
)
(business-process
(context caX) (from C) (resource Z) (to A)
)
Having the institutional normative background, these definitions are enough
for specifying the commitments between the different partners. The example can
be extended to more complex scenarios, involving an arbitrary number of agents,
resources and workflow definitions. Resources can represent product components,
documents, or any item that is to be exchanged between partners. Different norm
sets would be appropriate for different cases.
The realization of the EI framework involves the utilization of an agent platform
(such as JADE16), where agents interact. Besides external agents representing the
involved organizations, agents performing institutional roles need to be in place,
May 26, 2006 15:13 WSPC/INSTRUCTION FILE ijcis˙eas˙hlc˙eco˙final3
Institutional Reality and Norms: Specifying and Monitoring Agent Organizations 27
representing messenger, banking, and delivery-tracking facilities. These will inform
the agentified normative environment of the occurring events, enabling it to take into
account what is going on while it is monitoring norms. The normative environment
will map received messages to the corresponding illocution facts.
A number of procedures are also needed in order to make the prototype work.
Jess allows for an easy integration with Java programmed components that imple-
ment such functionalities, related to the creation of new contracts, the generation
of context-relevant time events, or the sending of messages from the normative en-
vironment to agents addressed by norms. Our working prototype includes all these
features.
6. Conclusions and Related Work
The regulation of multi-agent systems in environments with no central design (and
thus with no cooperative assumption), is gaining much attention in the research
community. Normative multi-agent systems3 address this issue by introducing in-
centives to cooperation (or discouraging deviation). After initial research on norms
as constraints on behavior, it is now accepted that autonomous agents are able to
deliberate whether to comply with norms5.
Searle’s work on speech acts26 and institutional reality27 has inspired several
researchers within the MAS field (e.g. Ref. 2, 6 and 15). In our case, we used
this inspiration as a means to certify the occurrence of real-world actions, essential
for contract monitoring purposes. Brute facts consist of agents’ illocutions, which
according to empowering relations are used to produce institutional reality.
The concept of electronic institutions is gaining importance inside MAS research.
We identify the main goals of an EI as being twofold. First, it aims at supporting
agent interaction as a coordination framework, making the establishment of business
agreements more efficient. Furthermore, it serves the purpose of providing a level
of trust by offering an enforceable normative environment.
Within the framework of our electronic institution19 providing services for the
achievement of contractually specified agreements (including VO scenarios), we de-
scribed the use of contextualized norms, the specification of contracts and the imple-
mentation of monitoring and enforcement mechanisms. Norms are typically related
with the deontic notions of obligation, permission and prohibition, and have been
used to formalize contracts25,18, or to specify interaction in agent societies10,24.
In our case, we essentially rely on obligations to specify contractual commitments.
Permissions are implicit with the definition of constitutive rules, which authorize
certain illocutions to certified agents. In this sense, not permitted actions will be
impossible. In the case of VO contracts, permissions can be seen as rights for re-
questing a partner’s contribution. Prohibitions may be applied as a consequence of
violation detection.
Previous approaches towards regulating agent behavior through EIs include
Ref. 11. However, this model formally defines institutions as having rigid performa-
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tive structures (consisting of scenes and transitions among these scenes) that guide
agent interactions. Complementing that approach, a middleware was developed12
which ensures that agents obey to the predefined protocol by constraining their
activity. By restricting the actions agents are allowed to perform, this model does
not cope well with a central property of agency: autonomy 31. In our approach,
we avoid imposing hard constraints on behavior. By enforcing norms, we do con-
duct and supervise the behavior of rational agents able to take into account their
pertinent norms.
Top-down normative frameworks (i.e., frameworks where norms are pre-specified
and imposed) are appropriate in situations where norms can be centrally designed,
although regulating a distributed environment with autonomous self-interested
agents. However, these approaches are not suitable to evolving normative environ-
ments, and are thus not amenable to contract handling. In such situations, agents
make agreements that are to be monitored by a trusted third-party (the EI); hence
the normative structure is modified by the corresponding contracts. Our work is
focused on providing such an evolving normative framework. We have shown how
norm monitoring and enforcement mechanisms can be put into place, taking into
account the creation of institutional reality.
We are exploiting our EI prototype, testing its capabilities as a normative frame-
work. Being an agent-based platform, the EI can be distributed over a number of
computers. However, the normative environment, within which norms are moni-
tored, seems to be a centralized component. This may represent a performance
limitation when dealing with a considerable number of agents and their contrac-
tual commitments. In future work we may study how to address this limitation by
implementing a distributed normative environment.
The explicit definition of permissions and prohibitions may be easily included
with our norm specification. Most importantly, in business scenarios the definition
of cross-contractual prohibitions is an important issue (e.g. antitrust or competition
policies). We have yet to study how inter-contextual norms can be defined. Also,
the illustration of VO settings will be enriched, to account for situations closer to
real-world instances (as described in Ref. 20).
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